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Living fossils, taxa with similar members now and in the deep past, have
recently come under scrutiny. Those who think the concept should be retained
have argued for its epistemic and normative utility. This paper extends the
epistemic utility of the living fossils concept to include ways in which a taxon’s
living fossil status can serve as evidence for other claims about that taxon. I will
use some insights from developmental biology to refine these claims. Insofar as
these considerations demonstrate the epistemic utility of the living fossils concept,
they support retaining the concept and using it in biological research.
Living fossils are taxa in which extant organisms morphologically resemble fossilized
organisms; paradigmatic examples include horseshoe crabs, coelacanths, and tuataras.
Recently the living fossil concept has received considerable criticism, with even
paradigmatic cases being contested. Some argue that the concept is not very useful for
biologists, since these diverse cases are unlikely to be the product of unified phenomena,
while others argue that the concept may be useful for certain epistemic and normative
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purposes. My aim in this paper is to address the epistemic value of living fossils. In
particular, I will address the following question: Given that a taxon is a living fossil,
what else do we know about it? Using considerations from developmental biology, I show
that many common inferences from morphological similarity fail in the context of living
fossils. I will argue, however, that there are some inferences that are justified. I conclude
that the living fossil concept has epistemic value, and hence should be retained.
After reviewing the recent literature (section 1), I will address three obvious
conclusions that we might want to draw about living fossils (section 2): (1)
non-morphological phenotypic similarity between the extant and past taxa, (2) the
existence of a persistent lineage that includes these taxa, and (3) a slow rate of
evolutionary change between these taxa. I will evaluate each of these inferences,
especially using insights from developmental biology (section 3).
1 Defining ‘living fossil’
Philosophers of biology have offered different characterizations of living fossils. Lidgard
and Love (2018) argue for ways in which the concept is useful in setting research
agendas, despite ambiguity in whether particular taxa should be classified as living
fossils. Turner (2019) suggests an explicit definition of living fossil, one which he believes
enables us to use living fossils to set conservation priorities. Specifically, Turner thinks
that living fossils are taxa which have:
1. Prehistorically deep morphological stability,
2. Few extant species, and
3. High contribution to phylogenetic diversity.
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Werth and Shear (2014) give a similar characterization of living fossils, picking out
“morphological conservatism” and “little taxonomic diversity” as relevant factors (434,
436).
Turner (2019) thinks there is epistemic value to the living fossil concept, including
that “observations of [extant organisms in a living fossil taxon] can surely tell us
something about the prehistoric ones” (11). The next two sections of this paper will
specify exactly what we might be able to learn about these prehistoric taxa on the basis
of their living fossil status. To sidestep debates about the specific definition of “living
fossil,” I will focus on the epistemic role of morphological similarity between past and
extant taxa, a feature unanimously associated with living fossils.
Note that this paper is concerned with the possibility that the living fossil concept is
epistemically valuable, although it may be valuable in other ways, including for
normative purposes (as Turner 2019 argues). One way in which the living fossils concept
might be epistemically valuable is that it helps us identify evolutionary episodes in need
of explanation. Lidgard and Love (2018) think this is one purpose of the concept. In this
case, a taxon’s living fossil status, or at least the various features associated with that
status, is the explanandum. However, in the remainder of this paper, I focus on another
possible epistemic role for the living fossils concept to serve: a taxon’s living fossil status
can serve as evidence for other claims about the members of that taxon.
2 Inferences from morphological similarity
To reject the arguments of skeptics who think we should do away with the living fossil
concept (e.g., Casane and Laurenti 2013, Mathers et al. 2013, Wagner et al. 2017), we
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should show what role the concept can play. Lidgard and Love and Turner recognize
this, although they have different ideas of what this role is. However, the authors seem
to be in agreement that part of what we want to be able to use the living fossil concept
for is making inferences from the fact that past and extant taxa are morphologically
similar to some other fact F about these taxa. For short:
morphological similarity → F (1)
Both Lidgard and Love and Turner agree that we should be able to use the living
fossil concept to make inferences of this form. Turner (2019) calls this the “epistemic
value” of focusing on the morphological resemblance of past to extant taxa (11).
One possible fact F that we may want to infer from morphological similarity between
two taxa is that these taxa are phenotypically similar in ways above and beyond their
morphological similarity. Take horseshoe crabs. Extant horseshoe crabs have hemocyanin
in their blood (they use copper rather than iron to transport oxygen). Turner (2019)
says, “the fossil record does not tell us that ancient horseshoe crabs had hemocyanin in
their blood. But that seems like a fairly safe inference, given our background knowledge
of phylogeny plus the observation that living ones do have hemocyanin in their blood”
(11). The general type of inference that Turner is making is something like:
morphological similarity → general phenotypic similarity (2)
So far, I have been talking about morphological similarity, rather than morphological
stability, the latter of which is used in Turner’s definition. Turner (2019) says that
showing morphological stability between past and extant taxa is equivalent to showing
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morphological similarity within a persistent lineage (3). If morphological similarity itself
was evidence for persistence of a lineage, then morphological similarity would be evidence
for morphological stability. In other words, the following inferences are equivalent:
morphologial similarity → persistence of lineage (3)
morphological similarity → morphological stability (4)
Finally, the living fossil concept may be useful for inferring rates of evolutionary
change:
morphological similarity → slow evolutionary rate (5)
It only makes sense to talk about a rate of evolution within a given lineage, so inference
3 is necessary for inference 5.
Inferences 2, 3, and 5 do not exhaust the possible inferences from morphological
similarity to F which we might make about living fossil taxa, but these examples show
the possibility of making inferences about living fossil taxa based on what else we know
about them. Thus these inferences provide good candidates if we want to demonstrate
the epistemic utility of the living fossil concept.




Various concepts and theories in evolutionary biology have been revised in light of
results in developmental biology. For example, developmental plasticity provides a
possible explanation of speciation events, one compatible with the theory of punctuated
equilibrium (West-Eberhard 2003). On the basis of such results, some have even
suggested replacing the Modern Synthesis with the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis
(e.g., Laland et al. 2015).
In this section, I will use some results in developmental biology to examine the
arguments using morphological similarity from section 2.
3.1 Non-morphological phenotypic similarity
Inference 2 says that we can infer from their morphological similarities that past and
extant taxa have phenotypic similarities above and beyond these morphological
similarities. For example, we would be able to infer the presence of hemocyanin in past
horseshoe crabs on the basis that they are morphologically similar to extant horseshoe
crabs.
Although I did not say this in section 2, one might have thought that the argument
relating morphological similarity to general phenotypic similarity was implicitly
assuming some relationship between morphological similarity and genetic similarity. If
morphological similarity was good evidence for genetic similarity, and genetic similarity
was good evidence for otherwise phenotypic similarity, then morphological similarity
would be good evidence for phenotypic similarity. Including the implicit step, inference 2
would become:
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morphological similarity → genetic similarity → general phenotypic similarity (6)
Even using a very rudimentary understanding of genetics, it is unlikely that inference
6 will work. The problem is that morphological similarity does not imply genetic
similarity. There is not, in general, a one-to-one correspondence between genes and
phenotypes, including morphology, so we can neither infer genetic information from
phenotypic information nor vice versa. The same genes can result in different
phenotypes, and the same phenotypes can be the result of different genes (e.g., Fusco
and Minelli 2010). The former is the result of developmental plasticity, whereby a variety
of environmental factors can affect phenotypic outcomes, for example by changing gene
expression. The latter can be explained by the interchangeability of genes and
environment in producing phenotypes,which West-Eberhard (2003) says “conflict[s] with
the habit of supposing that the specificity of the [developmental] response comes entirely
from the specificity of the gene” (117). If the argument from morphological similarity to
general phenotypic similarity depends on an inference from morphological similarity to
genetic similarity, the argument will fail, because the first half of inference 6 will turn
out to be false. Additionally, and perhaps more intuitively, whatever genetic similarity
might be implied by morphological similarity does not in itself imply the additional
genetic similarity required to generate phenotypic similarity above and beyond
morphology. In the case of the horseshoe crabs, different genes will be associated with
morphology than with presence of hemocyanin.
However, morphological similarity may imply otherwise phenotypic similarity more
7
directly, as indicated in the original inference 2. For instance, we might think that certain
non-morphological phenotypes are strongly correlated with particular morphologies.
Whether this correlation is plausible is going to depend on the non-morphological
phenotype. For instance, whether extant horseshoe crabs’ blood is similar to past
horseshoe crabs’ will depend on whether features of blood are strongly correlated with
morphology. If we had independent evidence that the contents of blood and an
organism’s morphology were strongly correlated, then the inference from the horseshoe
crabs’ morphology to their blood phenotype would be unproblematic. However, as
Lidgard and Love (2018) say, “[r]etention of some phenotypic (traditionally
morphological) characters does not adequately explain change or the lack thereof in
other phenotypic characters” (766, emphasis in original). Fortey (2011) also thinks that
there can be “no final proof one way or the other” about whether the past horseshoe
crabs’ blood contained hemocyanin (27).
In fact, developmental biologists have recently stressed the modularity of phenotypes.
This refers to the separability of phenotypes, despite possible integration among them;
developmental modules are semi-independent and dissociable, meaning that various
traits can occur in different combinations in different organisms, with varying degrees of
interdependence between different traits (West-Eberhard 2003, chpt. 4). These modules
can then be selected for separately. For instance, terrestrial and arboreal salamanders
have distinct foot morphology; the developmental pathways that lead to these differences
are relatively independent from the salamanders’ other traits, which go (more or less)
unaffected (Gilbert 2000). This is made possible by the branching nature of
development: cell differentiation occurs at branching decision points, which can be
triggered by genetic or environmental switches. West-Eberhard (2019) says that
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modularity is a “universal property of organismic traits,” because this branching process
is ubiquitous (357). In the context of living fossils, and specifically inference 2,
modularity means that morphological similarity – which may be dissociable or
independent from other phenotypes – does not provide adequate evidence for similarity
of non-morphological traits.
Of course, some modules are more interdependent, and can be expected to co-occur.
For example, morphology can constrain behavior such that particular behavioral traits
are strongly correlated with particular morphological traits. Whether presence of one
phenotype provides good evidence for presence of another phenotype depends on having
independent evidence of the ways in which the different developmental modules may be
interdependent.
Therefore, the wholesale inference from morphological similarity to phenotypic
similarity above and beyond morphology is unlikely to be justified. This is not just a
general skepticism about our ability to infer the presence of some traits from the
observation of others; developmental modularity gives us good reason to believe that
many traits are dissociable. More specific cases, where a correlation between morphology
and other phenotypes is independently established, may allow for appropriate use of this
inference in living fossil taxa. Indeed, Lidgard and Love (2018) suggest that one of the
questions that research on living fossils might be able to answer has to do with the role
of developmental modularity in patterns of evolutionary stasis (766). In other words, we
may be able to come to a better understanding of the ways in which different traits are
combined in developmental modules by studying stasis of these traits in living fossil taxa.
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3.2 Persistence of lineage
Inference 3 concludes on the basis of morphological similarity that the taxa are
phylogenetically related such that they are both part of the same, persistent lineage, or,
equivalently, that they are morphologically stable.
Note that neither Lidgard and Love nor Turner make the “lineage” relationship
precise. Being part of the same lineage cannot require that the past fossil is an ancestor
of the extant organisms, exactly, because we want to permit the past taxon and the
extant one having an as-yet-unidentified common ancestor.1 Neither can the lineage
relationship be as broad as a whole clade; it would become meaningless to differentiate
living fossils from other cases of relatedness between past and extant taxa. Although it is
beyond the scope of this paper to more precisely say what a lineage is, I take it that it is
something between an ancestor-descendant relationship and a clade.
Setting this aside: does morphological similarity imply persistence of lineage or
morphological stability?
As in the case of phenotypic similarity, perhaps there is an implicit assumption
contained in inference 3 that involves a relationship between morphology and genetics.
Inference 3 could be justified on the basis of this relationship: if morphological similarity
implies genetic similarity, and genetic similarity implies the phylogenetic relationship
that would hold within a persistent lineage, then morphological similarity would imply
persistence of lineage. The resulting inference is:
1This is likely the case with horseshoe crabs – see Fortey (2011).
10
morphological similarity → genetic similiarity → persistence of lineage (7)
I have already argued in section 3.1 that morphological similarity does not imply
genetic similarity, so inference 7 will not work.
However, we should consider whether morphological similarity implies persistence of
lineage without relying on a connection to genetic similarity. I will argue that there are
several reasons to think that it does not; however, morphological similarity is often the
best evidence we have of phylogenetic relationships.
First, morphological similarity and persistence of lineage do not exactly imply
morphological stability, because there is the possibility that the morphological trait was
lost and reemerged within the same lineage. Alternatively, if the past and extant taxa
are in the same clade but do not have an ancestor-descendant relationship, then it may
be possible that their common ancestor was not morphologically similar, in which case
the morphology would have had to emerge separately on two different branches of the
phylogenetic tree. This would be a case of convergent evolution, where the same traits
evolve twice. These considerations when checking for morphological stability are the
same as the well-known issues with testing for homology (similarity due to common
ancestry) in general.
Developmental biologists point out that developmental pathways, even if not
morphological traits, may be homologous (e.g., Nijhout 2019, 946). In these cases, which
are called parallelism (rather than convergence), the trait may appear to evolve
separately in two different branches, or may appear to be lost and reemerge, when in fact
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the mechanism by which the trait develops is actually homologous. It makes sense to
broaden our concept of homology to include parallel evolution and recurrence of traits
(West-Eberhard 2003, chpt. 25). I therefore concur with Turner (2019), although he does
not explicitly use these developmental considerations to argue that morphological
stability follows from morphological similarity.
Second, though, lack of morphological similarity may not be an indication of lack of
morphological stability; polymorphism within a single species is relatively common. Two
sample organisms from a species with morphologically distinct life stages may be
mistaken as organisms belonging to different species if the organisms are observed in
different of these life stages.2 Extreme cases of sexual dimorphism are also liable to being
mistaken for cases of multiple species. Note that both metamorphosis-induced life stages
and sexual dimorphism may be the result of the developmental modularity discussed
above (West-Eberhard 2003, 58, 75).
There is thus a risk of both false positives and false negatives in identifying
persistence of lineage if we focus on morphological similarity. If there were a better
indication of phylogenetic relationships than morphological similarity, we would use it
instead.
These considerations notwithstanding, morphological similarity is often the best
evidence we have for persistence of the same morphology over time, given that in the
context of fossils we only have sporadic sample organisms and not any direct evidence of
change over time.3 This is part of the explanation for why the morphological species
2Turner (2016) acknowledges this point explicitly (64). See also Currie 2016.
3Note that our ability to acquire genetic information about fossil specimens may im-
prove our epistemic position regarding phylogenetic relationships, if one thinks that the
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concept – rejected nearly unanimously as an adequate species concept for extant species
– is still used by paleontologists (e.g., Turner 2011, 49-50 and Werth and Shear 2014,
442-43). Often the best evidence we have for phylogenetic relationships involving fossils
is morphological similarities and differences, and persistence of lineage in the context of
living fossils is no different.
3.3 Evolutionary rates
The third candidate inference we might want to make from morphological similarity
within living fossil taxa is a slow rate of evolutionary change between the past and extant
taxa. Recall that the argument for a slow rate of evolutionary change requires that we
accept the inference to persistence of lineage. I have suggested that morphological
similarity is often the best evidence we can hope to have for persistence of lineage. In
this section I will assume that that inference is justified, and move on to examining
inference 5, from morphological similarity to a slow rate of evolutionary change.
As in sections 3.1 and 3.2, there is possibly an implicit assumption utilized here
involving genetics. Let’s ignore the possibility that the inference looks like this:
morphological similarity → genetic similarity → morphological stability → slow evolutionary rate
(8)
because we are assuming that morphological similarity is directly evidence for
morphological stability (and I have already argued that morphological similarity does
inference from genetic similarity to persistence of lineage is better than the inference from
morphological similarity. See Jablonski and Shubin (2015).
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not imply genetic similarity). In this case, the implicit justification for 5 is instead that
morphological stability implies genetic stability, which in turn implies a slow rate of
evolutionary change:
morphological similarity → morphological stability → genetic stability → slow evolutionary rate
(9)
Many of the arguments I have given already that morphological similarity will not
imply genetic similarity will be arguments against thinking that morphological stability
implies genetic stability. I will not rehearse these arguments, because there is further
reason to think that morphological stability does not imply genetic stability. Stabilizing
selection acting on plastic traits can maintain the same phenotype over time, without
necessarily having any effect whatsoever on rates of genetic change. For example,
developmental plasticity is expected, especially in cases of extremely plastic traits like
learning, to slow any directional increase or decrease in the propensity of a given
phenotype in a population, because there is not ample opportunity for selection to act on
any single phenotype (West-Eberhard 2003, 178). Furthermore, a process called
“phenotypic accommodation” allows organisms to maintain functional phenotypic traits
despite genetic mutation (West-Eberhard 2003, 51; see also West-Eberhard 2005).
The last step of inference 9 – from genetic stability to slow rate of evolutionary
change – is also problematic, although my critique here will be more controversial. An
intuitive view is that a slow rate of evolutionary change in a lineage just is a slow rate of
genetic change in that lineage, and that therefore the move from genetic stability to slow
rate of evolution is unproblematic (e.g., Schopff 1984, Ho 2008).
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But is this really what we mean by slow rates of evolutionary change? Cases of
stabilizing selection acting on phenotypes without causing a reduction in rates of genetic
change show that it does not make sense to equate evolutionary change with genetic
change. Traits on which stabilizing selection is acting should also be those traits which
we say have a slow rate of evolutionary change: “the rate and degree of modification of a
complex trait should be some positive function of its frequency of expression or use”
(West-Eberhard 2003, 169). Traits with stability in a given lineage are exactly the traits
with a slow rate of change. Therefore, there is no need to appeal to genetic stability to
make the case for slow rates for evolutionary change – we can infer slow rates of
evolutionary change directly from morphological stability.
Note that it is traits, and not lineages or taxa, to which we apply an evolutionary
rate. Selection acts on phenotypes, not on organisms, species, or lineages. Lidgard and
Love (2018) agree: “[c]haracters or character states are relatively more ancestral or
derived, not whole organisms or lineages” (761, citing Omland, Cook, and Crisp 2008).
Additionally, attribution of rates of change to traits rather than lineages is consistent
with the idea of developmental modularity.
One of Turner’s examples suggests that he thinks, in agreement with me, that
morphological stability, the first feature in his definition of living fossils, is a better
indication than molecular stability of slow rates of evolutionary change. Tuataras, a
reptile from New Zealand, were thought to be living fossils on the basis of morphological
stability, until researchers discovered that tuataras actually have a higher than average
rate of molecular evolution (Hay et al. 2008). Some have used this result to criticize
tuataras’ status as a living fossil (e.g., Carnall 2016). Turner (2019)’s first criticism of
this inference is that the Hay et al. (2008) study only uses mitochondrial DNA, which
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would not be expected to influence morphology (14). Turner’s next point is more relevant
for our purposes: he says that even if the study had used nuclear DNA, “developmental
processes might insulate morphology from rapid molecular change” and that “[r]apid
molecular change in the nuclear genome could also reflect selection pressures on aspects
of the organism, like the immune system, that never show up in the fossil record” (14).
These criticisms of the skeptics of tuataras’ living fossil status line up nicely with my
evaluation of the inference from morphological stability to genetic stability to a slow
evolutionary rate. Turner concludes that “in spite of the high rate of molecular change,
tuataras are a clear instance of a phylogenetic living fossil taxon” (15).4
However, Turner (2019) does not say that we can save the tuataras’ living fossil
status by appealing to a different idea of evolutionary rates. Indeed, his reconstruction of
the argument against tuataras counting as living fossils is that “living fossils must have
especially slow rates of evolutionary change, whereas the molecular evidence points
toward especially rapid evolution in tuataras” (14). Turner’s criticisms of this line of
reasoning challenge the idea that a slow rate of evolution is a necessary feature of a
living fossil taxa, rather than the idea that a slow rate of molecular change may not line
up with a slow rate of (character) evolution at all. Later, in discussing coelacanths
(another candidate for a living fossil taxon), Turner references “rates of morphological
change,” but does not equate these rates with rates of evolutionary change (16). Indeed,
Turner says that “morphological stability in certain characters is entirely compatible
with evolutionary change happening under the geological radar” (18). However, as I have
4Interestingly, Hay et al. (2008) also interpret their results about the faster-than-
expected rate of molecular evolution in tuataras as being evidence that “rates of neutral
molecular and phenotypic evolution are decoupled” (106).
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argued, morphological stability in certain characters is exactly not compatible with
evolutionary change happening on those characters. My suspicion is that Turner is
confusing rates of evolutionary change with rates of molecular change here.
Werth and Shear (2014) have a similar take on the case of tuataras. While Werth and
Shear do not think that evidence of a higher rate of molecular evolution in this lineage
disqualifies it as a living fossil taxon, they say that the high molecular rates “provide
strong evidence countering the misconception that living fossils have stopped evolving”
(438). In other words, Werth and Shear – like Turner – apparently want to maintain the
tuataras’ status as a living fossil by arguing that living fossils need not have a slow rate
of evolutionary change, rather than by claiming that rates of evolutionary change are
best measured at the level of traits and not genes, necessarily (although insofar as genes
are themselves traits, a rate of evolution could apply to them as well).5
One implication of focusing on the inference from morphological stability to slow
rates of evolutionary change is that it is not clear what the epistemic role evidence of
molecular stability in a lineage could have. Lidgard and Love (2018) say, “the primary
role of the living fossil concept is to mark out more precisely what requires explanation
in a given instance for a particular entity in order to account for morphological and
molecular stability or persistence over long periods of evolutionary time” (763, emphasis
added). If molecular stability does not let us infer an evolutionary rate (other than an
evolutionary rate at the molecular level itself), then why might we want to know about
5Note that Werth and Shear do acknowledge that “Some biologists speculate that mere
genetic change does not translate to evolutionary change” and that there is ”independence
between molecular and morphological evolution,” although they do not endorse this posi-
tion (439).
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molecular stability at all? Lidgard and Love have (at least) one interesting response: we
might want to know how molecular and morphological rates of change are related or
decoupled (766).
It is especially interesting that the inference to slow evolutionary rates from
morphological similarity is the most secure of those I have considered in this paper,
because Darwin (1859/1964)’s use of the term “living fossils” was in the context of
explaining why some lineages display slower rates of evolutionary change than others.
While Darwin’s explanation was that these lineages had been “exposed to less severe
competition” (107), and now we know that the reasons for stabilizing selection are more
complicated, he still made, by my account, the most reasonable inference from the
morphological similarity of extant and past taxa.
The various attempted inferences and critiques of these inferences examined in this
section are summarized in table 1.
4 Conclusion
This paper’s primary contribution has been to disambiguate the inferences that we can
justifiably make on the basis of classifying a taxon as a living fossil. In doing so, I have
specified some of the ways in which the living fossil concept may be epistemically useful.
This adds to claims that the living fossil concept is epistemically useful in other ways,
such as by identifying phenomena in need of explanation. I also intend to complement,
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Table 1: Summary.
reasons. One possible area for future research is identifying the ways in which the
epistemic and non-epistemic uses of the concept may interact. For instance, Turner
thinks that a living fossil taxon’s high contribution to phylogenetic diversity has
implications for conservation efforts. But we may need to address epistemic issues before
we are able to draw appropriate normative conclusions.
This paper has also served as an example of how developmental biology can be useful
for paleontologists. Historically, development hasn’t been given much consideration in
making claims about fossils, largely because fossil evidence does not include information
about developmental processes. Discussions of homology in general, which are relevant
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to persistence of lineage, involve the contributions of both paleontologists and
developmental biologists. Living fossils serve as another good example for how
considerations from developmental biology and paleontology could be productively
combined, because we have evidence about fossilized as well as living taxa. The
arguments I have made in this paper, such as those regarding developmental modularity,
may have other implications for paleontology outside of the context of living fossils, and
more generally point to the fertility of of exploring the intersection between
developmental biology and paleontology.
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